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Introduction* 
Adoption may be defined as “the legal process through which the state establishes a parental relationship, 
with all its attendant rights and duties, between a child and a (set of) parent(s) where there exists no previous 
procreative relationship” (De Wispelaere and Weinstock 2018, 213). In adoptions from care, state 
intervention effectively converts an established, or nascent, adult-child relationship into ‘family’ in the legal 
sense. From the state’s perspective, adoption thus entails the transfer of parental responsibilities for a child 
in public care to a private family unit, enabling the state to permanently delegate its duties towards a child 
to this new unit. This seemingly straightforward legal act raises deeper philosophical questions relating to 
such state ‘family creation’, particularly when the child’s perspective is taken. Such child-centric approach 
normatively regards children as equal moral beings, who ought to be included in actions concerning them, 
regardless of their capacity to form and express an opinion. Accordingly, adoption from care can be 
described as a moral decision, aimed at doing what is in the child’s best interests. The purpose of this chapter 
is to explore a suspicion of lack of child-centrism in adoption from care practice, and to illustrate how 
adopted children’s rights are inferior to those of their nonadopted peers. This will shed light on a practice 
currently lacking transparency and accountability (cf. Burns et al. 2019) and will increase our understanding 
of how we fail to treat children as equal moral individuals in decision-making that severely impacts children’s 
lives. 
The law plays a critical role in adoption, as its status-conferring power determines who falls within the state’s 
protective sphere, and who is excluded from it. ‘Parent’ is one example, in that the legal status of parenthood 
confers upon an individual certain rights and obligations concerning a child. This status may or may not 
align with the social reality of those involved; ‘parent’ or ‘family’ as social constructs may well differ from 
social life as experienced by children and parents in the non-traditional social kinship network formed by 
adoption, including birth and adoptive family members.  
This chapter attempts to provide some child-centric insights to identify relevant ways to improve adoption 
from care for adopted children. Specifically, the basic premise of adoption, namely the creation of a stable 
and permanent family for the child, will be assessed through a child lens. A critique of the current approach 
to adoption as adult-centric is presented, starting with a reflection on the concept of ‘family’ in the context 
of adoption. The next part introduces adoption as a moral decision from the child’s perspective. Part three 
considers adopted children’s rights, focusing on the consequences of adoption practice on children’s rights. 
Finally, the challenges discussed in this chapter will be summarised and some moderate suggestions for 
reform will be proposed.  
 
‘Family’ 
The question of what family is has received much attention, yet no universally accepted definition exists, at 
least not when crossing contexts or disciplines. Some ask if a definition is even necessary, or if we can ignore 
the decision of who is part of the family, as long as we know what the characteristics of a family are (Ferguson 
and Brake 2018, 11–12). One characteristics-based definition describes family as a multigenerational unit 
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consisting of one or more adults, taking primary custodial responsibility for any number of dependent 
children (Archard, 2010, 9–10), where this unit exists over a substantial period. Temporary foster care as 
lacking permanence and being contract-based may thus be excluded; however, from a child perspective, 
placement length does not always predict relationship quality (Andersson 2009). Many alternative ‘family’ 
definitions exist; often focussing on caring function over family form. This form-function binary, whilst 
appealing for its simplicity, fails to persuade precisely because of this simplicity: it does not capture the 
complexities of ‘family’ (Ferguson and Brake 2018, 13), which would be necessary for any satisfactory – 
morally defensible and practically useful – definition of family.  
The concept of family is shaped by normative assumptions about personal relationships, which is evident 
from the tensions between legal and moral parenthood and the different views on what makes one a parent 
or a family. The law only recognises ‘family’ as a legal status relationship in some contexts (such as 
migration), while requiring a more specific familiar relationship in others (such as ‘parent’) (Ferguson and 
Brake 2018, 17). This is relevant in the present context, as adoption entails a shift of status attribution, with 
the consequence that the adopted child receives new (legal) parents. Family is thus not simply a private 
realm, but a social institution supported by laws. Feminists argue that as a political institution, the family 
should therefore be subject to principles of justice, as the state cannot avoid interference in families, 
especially given the state’s critical interest in children as future citizens (Satz 2017). In adoptions from care, 
the state interferes in families in one of the most serious ways, by first breaking legal (and sometimes social) 
ties with the family of origin, and then deciding and confirming the child’s alternative family. Here, the 
question arises as to how adopted children themselves construe family and to what extent the law’s limited 
possibilities do justice to their experiences.  
In adoption, the basic premise concerning ‘family’ may be best described as a compromise: Birth parents 
unable to provide (adequate) care for their child are replaced by alternative carers to safeguard the child’s 
welfare. Often, this is the most personally, socially and legally stable option for children (Palacios et al. 2019, 
57), and in line with children’s rights’ emphasis on growing up in a family environment (CRC 1989). This 
aim to give a child a new, permanent family through adoption is persuasive; yet creating ‘family’ by legal 
deed can at best provide the breeding ground for emotional and social family-like bonds. In adoptions from 
care, this is particularly relevant, as the absence of actual abandonment means the substitution of family is 
unilateral only and requires justification. This compares to full orphans or abandoned children, where the 
necessity to find alternative carers is obvious. The severity of neglect or maltreatment, and the resulting 
threat to the child’s health (and sometimes life) seen in many child protection cases provides a justification 
not only for removal, but also for finding a permanent solution outside of the birth home if the possibility 
of reunification has legitimately been ruled out. 
Ideally, adoption will align the child’s experience of de facto with de jure family, where de facto reflects actual 
bonds and not mere living arrangements. Again, adoption from care is a special case, where the reasons for 
excluding the birth family entirely from the de jure family are far less clear than in cases of abandoned or 
anonymously-born children. From the child’s perspective, social and emotional bonds, lived experience and 
identity do not necessarily align with legal relationships, as shown by numerous empirical studies (see Blake 
2017 for an overview). Familial association cannot be forced, whether through the law or otherwise, and in 
adoption often fails to fit neatly within the narrow legal notion of ‘family’. The law itself here is instructive, 
in that human rights law recognises the ‘right to respect for family life’ (e.g. Art. 8 ECHR), rather than a ‘right 
to family’ or a ‘right to family life’, as the latter two are beyond the reach of the law. While the former is 
nonsensical in that we all have family at least in the narrow sense of biological kin, the latter would be 
impossible to enforce if understood as having meaningful and loving relationships with our family members. 
Indeed, the human rights approach is more modest in respecting family life where it already exists or where it 
is developing, which poses challenges in cases of very young children (Breen et al. 2020). Stability, the law 
can provide; meaningful family life not so much.  
This is a reminder to view ‘family’ in adoptions from care from the child’s perspective. Adoption should 
always be ‘in the child’s best interests’ (CRC 1989 Art. 21), yet the child seems absent in much of the process. 
For instance, the beneficence of adoption is typically framed in terms of outcomes compared to children 
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remaining in foster care (Vinnerljung and Hjern 2011), and by reference to low adoption breakdown rates 
in countries such as England and Wales (Wijedasa and Selwyn 2017) as a sign of success in providing 
stability.1 This emphasis on “hard” empirical data, however, only expresses one aspect of adoption, albeit 
an important one. The experience of those affected most by adoption from care, children and adult-
adoptees, is rarely considered adequately. Featherstone and colleagues caution that while “adoption may 
meet the needs of a particular calculative logic, it must be questioned from a perspective that considers 
ethical and human rights considerations for all concerned, including [the child] herself” (2018, 22). This has 
also been highlighted by many in the adult-adoptee community, who through the new possibilities of social 
media have been given a voice that speaks from experience, for instance via the hashtag #AdultAdoptee. 
The popularity of Nancy Verrier’s The Primal Wound amongst adoptees demonstrates the desperation of 
adoptees to be seen, and for adoption to be understood from their perspective. In what has been described 
as ‘the adoptee’s bible’, Verrier writes:  
What the general population considers to be a concept, a social solution for the care of children 
who cannot or will not be taken care of by their biological parents, is really a two-part, devastating 
experience for the child. The first part of the experience is the abandonment itself. […] The second 
part of the experience is that of being handed over to strangers. (Verrier 2009, 10).  
Of course, adoption experience varies from one adoptee to another, and no voice can speak for all adopted 
children. The diversity of views emerging from these discussions is instructive in discovering themes in 
adoption experiences from the child’s perspective and reveal the need to give a voice to the children 
themselves, during the adoption process and beyond.   
 
The child’s perspective in adoption 
The child’s perspective is a way of conceptualising and including the child in decision-making proceedings. 
At its heart is the notion of child-centrism, which puts the child at the core of one’s considerations. While 
ideally entailing direct involvement (participation) of the child, constructing a child perspective goes further 
by also including the child’s unvoiced situation in the context of the action to be taken. A child perspective 
normatively regards children as moral individuals regardless of their capacity to form and express an opinion. 
In adoptions from care, this is particularly relevant as children are often too young to (fully) participate in 
the process.  
The term ‘adoption’ has its roots in the Latin word adoptare, meaning ‘to choose for oneself’ (Hoad 2003). 
With a few exceptions, it is not the child who chooses to be adopted, or by whom,2 but the decision is made 
by adults for their own reasons (cf. Malm and Welti 2010), aided by the state ‘in the child’s best interests’. 
In child protection, the state makes the decision. Language is political (Orwell 2013) and powerful (Tutu 
1999), so regardless of good intentions and empirically-reported benefits of adoption, the very label we 
attach to a process that begins with a traumatic event for the child (and often others) implies a positivity not 
everyone involved may experience unequivocally. While for the adopters the completion of the process may 
also mark the completion of their ‘family’, the official term of choice for this happening appears to objectify 
rather than to recognise the child, and denies the fact that someone’s gain is someone else’s loss, and 
crucially, for the child it is both. This may or may not involve a deeper trauma or ‘primal wound’, but from 
the child’s perspective, adoption is not simply an endpoint in a care history, but also the beginning of 
‘adopted identity’ (Leighton 2005). That many adopted children report positive feelings related to their 
adoption is not in conflict with the idea that this ‘adopted identity’ may come with significant emotional, 
social and practical challenges, which are unique to the individual. This highlights the need to involve the 
 
1 System differences and lack of comprehensive data render inter-country comparisons of adoption breakdown rates 
challenging (see Palacios et al. 2018).  
2 Exceptions include older children wishing to be adopted by adults they have a close relationship with, including 
stepparents they are already living with.  
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child concerned in the issue of using adoption to create a stable and loving family environment for that 
child.  
Adoption as a moral decision requires taking the child’s perspective, even where direct input from the child 
is limited or impossible (for instance, due to age). Treating children as moral individuals requires openness 
to a broad range of experiences, feelings, and interpretations of facts. An example is separation trauma, 
which may occur even in infants. The mother-baby bond may be understood as a profound and special 
connection (cf. Winnicott 1966), and prenatal bonding has been shown to affect child development (Glover 
and Capron 2017). However, concluding that all children placed in care experience separation trauma, or to 
the same extent, would be mistaken, warranting instead a child-specific assessment.  
Current deficiencies in child-centrism can be exemplified by adoption marketing. While it is not the purpose 
of a child to ‘complete a family’ or to ‘be saved’, this is often how adoption is portrayed by adults for adults. 
In extreme cases, private and public adoption agencies promote children available for adoption in the same 
way as animal shelters try to re-home puppies (e.g. One Adoption; AdoptUSKids). Even if online profiles 
of to-be-adopted children increase the likelihood of adoption, such ‘effectiveness’ cannot morally justify 
promoting children in a way that breaches their privacy rights and objectifies them to appeal to adults. It is 
intrinsically wrong to promote children as if they were goods, irrespective of the outcome for the child: 
“Even if buyers did not mistreat the children they purchased, a market in children would express and 
promote the wrong way of valuing them. Children are not properly regarded as consumer goods but as 
beings worthy of love and care” (Sandel 2012). This argument has force, even where no strong or obvious 
commercial element exists. Practices such as ‘adoption parties’ and photo-listings of children available for 
adoption exemplify how the process of adoption is largely adopter-centric, for adults who are enabled to 
‘rescue’ a child in need and to ’complete’ their family –governments’ and official adoption agencies’ rhetoric, 
as a simple web search for official adoption information reveals (Table 1).3  
Table 1. Adoption descriptions on states’ official websites (government or official adoption agencies).  
Country4 Description of adoption Perspective 
Austria* “There are many reasons for wanting to adopt a child. Adoption offers everyone 
involved a new opportunity.” (Bundeskanzleramt 2020)  
(Original: Die Gründe, ein Kind adoptieren zu wollen, sind vielfältig. Eine Adoption bietet allen 
Beteiligten eine neue Chance.) 
Neutral 
England Government website only describes adoption process.  
 Regional adoption agency (Greater Manchester): “Adoption is life changing. You 
become the legal parent of a child who cannot – for whatever reason – live with 
their birth parents. You’ll take on the same legal rights and responsibilities of a 
birth parent and provide a permanent home for the child you adopt. Your child 
will take on your surname and become a member of your family for life.” 
(Adoption Counts 2019) 
Adult-centric 
Estonia “Adoption is a legal procedure in which the legal obligations and rights of a child 
are created between the adoptive parent and the child similarly to those between a 
biological parent and a child. The objective of adoption is to find a proper and 
loving family for children deprived of parental care. […] Adoption must always 




Germany* “For many couples, adoption is the only way to fulfil their desire to have children. 
The welfare of the child is always at the centre of adoption placement.” (Adoption 
2019) 
(Original: “Eine Adoption ist für viele Paare die einzige Möglichkeit, ihren Kinderwunsch zu 
erfüllen. Im Mittelpunkt der Adoptionsvermittlung steht immer das Wohl des Kindes.“) 
Adult-centric 
 
3 The search was conducted using “adoption + COUNTRY” as search term and identifying the top-listed 
government website. Where this yielded no description, capital city was used instead (England, Spain). For England, 
the second largest metropolitan area, Greater Manchester, was chosen for simplicity, as London has multiple 
adoption authorities.   
4 Selection based on the countries represented in this volume.  
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Finland “The purpose of adoption is to promote the welfare of a child by creating a child-
parent relationship between the adoptee and the prospective adopter.” (National 
Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health 2020) 
Child-centric 
Ireland “The nature and effect of an Irish adoption order is that the child becomes the child 
of the adopters as if born to them in marriage with all the rights and duties of parents 
and children in relation to each other.” (The Adoption Authority of Ireland 2019) 
Adult-centric 
Norway5 “The purpose of adoption is to provide a good and lasting home to a child who 
cannot be cared for by their biological parents.” (Bufdir 2019) 
(Original: Formålet med adopsjon er å gi et godt og varig hjem til et barn som ikke kan bli tatt 
hånd om av sine biologiske foreldre.)  
Child-centric 
Spain* Government website only describes adoption process.  
 Regional government: “Adoption is a child protection measure that provides a 
definitive family to children who, due to certain circumstances, cannot remain in 
their family of origin.” (Comunidad de Madrid 2019)  
(Original: La adopción es una medida de protección a la infancia que proporciona una familia 
definitiva a niños y niñas que, por determinadas circunstancias, no pueden permanecer en su 
familia de origen.) 
Child-centric 
USA “Adoption is the creation of a new, permanent relationship between an adoptive 
parent and child. Once this happens, there is no legal difference between a child 
who is adopted and a child who is born into a family.” (U.S. Government Services 
2020) 
Adult-centric 
*Translations author’s own. 
This overview may give reason for hope: descriptions in Estonia, Finland, Norway and Spain are child-
centric, Austria is neutral, while England, Ireland, Germany and the USA are adult-centric. This shows that 
child-centric adoption language and descriptions are possible. However, the comparison also reveals 
‘saviour’ and ‘family completion’ narratives, as well as those of ‘normalisation’ and ‘opportunity’, which may 
contribute to perpetuating shame or stigma historically associated with adoption, or in soliciting undue 
gratitude from adoptees. Advocates for those affected by adoption criticise this ‘positive adoption language’ 
or ‘respectful adoption language’ as being respectful only to adopters (OriginsCanada 2009). The connection 
between language and perspective taken matters: How we discuss adoption reflects our attitude towards 
children in general, and towards to-be-adopted children. Table 1 shows that child-centrism as an approach 
rooted in understanding children as equal moral individuals has not been internalised to the extent that it is 
reflected in our language. This lack of internalised child-centrism is also apparent in the adopted children’s 
rights. While it might be assumed that the status-conferring power of the law serves to align the protection 
of adopted children’s rights with those of nonadopted children, this is far from the case, as will be shown 
in the next section.  
 
Adopted child’s rights 
Children in care have been identified as a vulnerable group of children (UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child 2013), and some adopted children continue to be stigmatised in society (Baden 2016; Garber and 
Grotevant 2015). Intersectionality is also often an issue, as many children in care for whom adoptive families 
are sought are marginalised for several reasons, such as a combination of chronic illness, disability, ethnicity, 
or gender. In addition, adoption from care may involve complex trauma, from maltreatment leading to 
adoption as well as from separation, as described above. Therefore, even though adoption outcomes are 
typically better than available alternatives (van IJzendoorn, Juffer, and Poelhuis 2005), the way adoption is 
handled from the child’s perspective can and should be improved. A crucial point is to introduce a child-
centric adoption narrative, which should consider the voices of past, present and future adoptees as a starting 
point. This will serve to identify shortcomings of adoption as we currently know it. 
 
5 Refers to international adoptions. No domestic adoption description, as these are rare in Norway, typically around a 
dozen per year.  
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A few words on vulnerability, consent and participation are in order. Describing adopted children as 
vulnerable is not to victimise or disempower them, but to acknowledge that the separation of a child from 
her birth parents (at the time and in retrospect) is traumatic, even if we cannot quite fathom how very young 
children experience such separation. Crucially, the notion of vulnerability is also about responsibility, 
connoting special responsibilities to those whose interests are vulnerable to our actions and choices 
(Lindemann 2019, 32), including an obligation to focus on and involve the child in the entire adoption 
process. Unfortunately, child-centrism appears to be substituted with legalistic mechanisms, such as consent. 
The child’s consent to adoption, as required in Europe (Fenton-Glynn 2013), constitutes no more than the 
bare minimum of child participation in adoption, and is far removed from actual child-centrism. Depending 
on age and circumstances, young children are unlikely to grasp fully the relevance of legal ‘parent’ status, or 
the wider legal and social implications of its transferral. Beyond consent, a review of adoption from care 
cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has shown that consideration of the child’s 
views and opinion remains the exception (Breen et al. 2020). While the child’s right to be heard has been 
formalised in Art. 12 CRC, and thus harmonised across the world through near universal ratification of the 
CRC, the situation concerning adopted children’s rights can be best described as messy. Disclosure and 
access to information rights are patchy, and available documentation following an adoption from care is not 
fit for purpose.  
The role of the law here is instrumental. In adoptions from care, it defines who gets access to which 
information and under which circumstances. Crucial dimensions are knowledge about the adoption itself, 
information about birth parents and the circumstances leading to the adoption. While further relevant 
aspects exist, these are singled out because they relate to information that others – the state, social workers 
and usually adoptive parents – will have, while the adopted person may not have (full) access to the same 
information. This cannot be reconciled with a child-centric view of adopted children as equal moral beings. 
A review of relevant national legal provisions reveals that the rights of adoptees to obtain information about 
their histories also vary across countries (Table 2). This is surprising, as adopted children are unlikely to 
differ in a morally relevant way across borders; rather, as a group, they may ‘face some unique problems in 
forging a sense of self’ (Witt 2005, 138). 
 
Table 2. Information rights of adopted children in domestic6 adoptions.7 










Right to access 
original birth 
record / adoption 
file8 
Access rights compared to 
child’s consent to 
adoption requirement 
Austria Both birth and adoptive 
parents  
Current legal parents No From age 14 
 
No fixed age for consent to 
adoption (typically required 
from age 14). 




Original birth certificate 
becomes void.  
Adoption certificate 
issued, names current 
legal parents. Short 
version: no information 
about adoption, long 
version: excerpt from 
registry, includes date of 
adoption. 
No Age 18 
 
Child’s consent not required 
for adoption, but child’s 
wishes must be ascertained. 
Estonia Current legal parents Excerpt from registry No Age 18**/*** Consent age lower (Age 10) 
Finland Current legal parents Excerpt from registry No From age 12 
 
Same (Age 12) 
 
6 International adoptees’ rights are often even more limited. 
7 My gratitude to Salomé Adroher Biosca (Spain), Tore Lied (Norway), Katre Luhamaa (Estonia), Conor O’Mahony 
(Ireland) and Tarja Pösö (Finland) for their help in compiling this information. Please refer to the bibliography for 
references to national laws.  
8 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2018  
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Germany Both birth and adoptive 
parents  
Current legal parents No From age 16** 
 
Consent age lower (Age 14) 
Ireland Birth parents; separate 
Adopted Children 
Register 
Birth parents; sealed 
upon adoption.  
 
Adoption certificate 
issued, names current 
legal parents. 
No No legal right. 
Adoptee may apply 
to AAI for release 
of original birth 
certificate; usually 
granted where birth 
mother agrees or 
where she is 
deceased. Records 
provided are often 
heavily redacted, so 
that any 
information that 
would identify the 
birth parents is no 
longer visible. 
No legal right to access 
adoption file. Child’s 
consent not required for 
adoption. 
Norway Current legal parents; 
separate Adopted 
Children Register 
Excerpt from registry Yes  
 
Age 18; actively 
informed 
Consent age lower (Age 12) 
Spain Birth parents, annotated 
“adopted”. Adoptive 
parents can request to 
issue a new birth record 
omitting birth parents 
(original record is kept 
and sealed).  
Current legal parents No Age 18 
 




Current legal parents; no 
registry but publicly 
accessible database from 
the California 
Department of Public 
Health. Original birth 
record sealed upon 
adoption. 
Birth parents; sealed 
upon adoption.  
 
Adoption Birth 
Certificate issued, names 
current legal parents. 
No Limited. From age 
21 where birth 
parent consent 
given. Access to 
file by court-order 
only.  
Consent age lower (Age 12) 
 
**Younger children may access this information with their parents’ consent. 
***Restrictions apply if biological parents or siblings did not provide consent to their identity being disclosed, or if such information is not 
in the child’s best interests. 
Source: Country references, all accessed 31 March 2020:  




England – Adoption and Children Act. 2002. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/38/contents;  
Finland – Adoption Act 2012. 2012/ 22 
https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2012/en20120022?search%5Btype%5D=pika&search%5Bkieli%5D%5B
0%5D=en&search%5Bpika%5D=adoption%20act;  
Germany – Personenstandsgesetz. 2007. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/pstg/BJNR012210007.html;  
Norway – Lov Om Adopsjon (Adopsjonsloven) 2017 https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2017-06-16-48;  
Spain – Código Civil 1889 https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rd/1889/07/24/(1)/con and Reglamento de La Ley Del 
Registro Civil 1958 https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1958-18486; and  
USA (California) – Family Code http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?tocCode=fam.  
 
Table 2 shows that information about birth parents is not easy to obtain. While nonadopted children can 
check their birth certificate,9 adoptees will only see their current legal parents’ names. Even where biological 
parents’ names are recorded in the population registry, as in Austria and Germany, these are not accessible 
to private individuals. Some countries (England, Ireland, Norway) maintain separate Adopted Children 
Registries, but again these are not publicly accessible. Names play an important role here. ‘Name’ is explicitly 
mentioned as part of the child’s identity protected by law (e.g. Art.8 CRC), yet emphasis is often placed on 
the fact that the adopted child will take on the adopter’s last name, and even first names may be changed 
(Table 1). ‘Preservation’ then seems reduced to keeping a record of the child’s original name, for 
administrative purposes, and possibly for the child to access at some point (Table 2). None of the countries 
 
9 Except where paternity (and sometimes maternity) is unknown.  
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studied issues a post-adoption certificate that includes both birth and adoptive parents, listing only current 
legal parents. Adoption records are kept, but adoptees often face practical obstacles in gaining access to 
information. Ireland and California require an application, birth parent information is restricted to non-
identifying information unless birth parents have consented, and files may be heavily redacted. Even in 
countries with a legal right to access adoption information, age limits apply: in most countries, adoptees 
must reach legal majority while three countries allow adopted children access (Austria at 14, Finland at 12, 
Germany at 16). This is in contrast with child consent to adoption requirements, which are – where 
applicable – consistently lower (same in Finland).   
While nonadopted children typically have access to their family histories, “[f]or an adopted child, the process 
of creating a narrative of the self may well require knowledge of biological or genetic origins (as far as these 
are available) and not because these are thought to determine any particular characteristic of the adopted 
child, but in order to complete the narrative of the self.” (Witt 2005, 140). This differential in available 
knowledge about one’s past cannot be fully remedied; however, a child-centric approach would ensure that 
whatever is available be made more readily accessible. Adoptees should not have to justify their wanting to 
know, they should have a right to know. Only Norway imposes an obligation on adopters to inform children 
about their adoption as soon as advisable and notifies adoptees of their access rights upon reaching legal 
majority. All other countries rely on adopters’ goodwill to inform children of their adoption.  
The findings in Table 2 demonstrate the lack of equal moral standing adoptees have, as they continue to 
struggle to obtain information that others hold about them. Deliberately depriving any child of this 
knowledge seems irreconcilable with a view of children as moral agents. This should be a strong argument 
for the granting of information rights to all adoptees, irrespective of their country of origin or residence.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate child-centrism in current adoption from care practice, 
and to compare adopted children’s rights with their nonadopted peers’. While adoption clearly has its place 
within child welfare measures by providing substitute families to many children who cannot be cared for by 
their birth families, more needs to be done to ensure that the child remains firmly at the centre of adoption 
throughout the process, and beyond.  
The examples of adoption language and birth records may seem academic issues, but they reveal who 
currently controls the discourse. Child-centrism urges us to put the adopted child first, and to listen to 
adoptee voices in progressing adoptions from care. An urgent starting point would be to put adopted 
children’s rights on an equal footing with those of nonadopted children. As moral individuals, children 
should not be marketed, and they should not have to show cause when it comes to information about their 
family history. Current access practices reveal a disconnect between many adopted children’s holistic social 
and emotional family and the family created through the legal act of adoption. How much this matters can 
be seen from recent events in New York state, where in January 2020, a new law came into force, enabling 
adoptees to obtain copies of their original birth certificates, and thousands of requests were filed within days 
(Engel 2020). Signing the legislation, Governor Cuomo (2020) said: “Every person has the right to know 
where they come from, and this new law grants all New Yorkers the same unrestricted rights to their original 
birth records. […] After years of being denied this basic human right, adoptees will finally be able to obtain 
critical information about their origins, family histories and medical backgrounds.”  
 
While names, certificates and website descriptions may not matter to all adopted children equally, and 
possibly not at all to some, the key issue is that all children must have their rights respected, and adopted 
children should have their perspective taken into consideration. Since preferences cannot be determined a 
priori, flexibility is required to accommodate the individuality of adopted children (Krutzinna, in progress). 
This might require the state to use its powers to create records that allow for multiple sets of parents, 
9 
 
combinations of birth and adoptive names, to ease access to information held on file and to facilitate contact 
between separated family members if they so wish.  
Adoption as a moral decision requires us to consider how it affects the child, and the adult that child 
eventually becomes. This chapter has highlighted only some aspects of adoptions from care that could be 
improved to become more child-centric; many others exist. Thus, our collective goal must be to work 
towards ensuring that adoptions from care always treat children as the moral agents they are.  
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